We describe the pension plan features of the states and the largest cities and counties in the U.S. Unlike in the private sector, defined benefit (DB) pensions are still the norm in the public sector. However, a few jurisdictions have shifted towards defined contribution (DC) plans as their primary savings plan, and fiscal pressures are likely to generate more movement in this direction. Holding fixed a public employee's work and salary history, we show that DB retirement income replacement ratios vary greatly across jurisdictions. This creates large variation in workers' need to save for retirement in other accounts. There is also substantial heterogeneity across jurisdictions in the savings generated in primary DC plans because of differences in the level of mandatory employer and employee contributions. One notable difference between public and private sector DC plans is that public sector primary DC plans are characterized by required employee or employer contributions (or both), whereas private sector plans largely feature voluntary employee contributions that are supplemented by an employer match. We conclude by applying lessons from savings behavior in private sector savings plans to the design of public sector plans. The picture in the public sector is very different. In most jurisdictions, a DB pension is still the primary retirement income benefit offered to employees. However, some jurisdictions have followed the private sector and shifted towards a DC system. Going forward, fiscal pressures are likely to generate more movement in this direction. Even jurisdictions with a primary DB plan currently offer supplemental DC plans.
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Over the past 30 years, employer-sponsored defined contribution (DC) savings plans have displaced defined benefit (DB) pensions in the private sector. There were 2.4 active DB participants for each active DC participant in the private sector in 1975, but these proportions had more than flipped by 2007, when there were 3.4 active DC participants for each active DB participant (U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefit Security Administration, 2008 and . Several factors have been implicated in this shift, including increased regulatory costs for DB providers following the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974, the legislated creation of an attractive (to employers) alternative to the DB pension through section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code in 1978, and workers' interest in portable pension benefits as the labor force has become more mobile.
The picture in the public sector is very different. In most jurisdictions, a DB pension is still the primary retirement income benefit offered to employees. However, some jurisdictions have followed the private sector and shifted towards a DC system. Going forward, fiscal pressures are likely to generate more movement in this direction. Even jurisdictions with a primary DB plan currently offer supplemental DC plans.
The distinction between DB and DC plans is an important one. In a DB plan, participants have little impact on the income that they will receive in retirement other than through their choice of when to leave their job. Plan sponsors dictate the formula that determines the payments to retired participants. Sponsors also decide with the help of highly trained financial professionals how much money to save today to fund these future payments and where these savings are invested.
In a DC plan, participants usually must choose how much to spend out of their assets during retirement, how much to contribute to the plan before retirement, and how to invest plan assets with limited guidance from their employer or plan sponsor. The consequences of having individuals with low levels of financial sophistication make complicated financial decisions has been well-documented in the literature: individuals procrastinate, their savings outcomes are heavily influenced by plan design features such as employer-selected defaults, they place too much weight on information that is not relevant (e.g., past asset returns), and they place too little weight on information that is relevant (e.g., mutual fund fees). 4 We begin this paper by surveying the retirement plans offered in the public sector, evaluating the generosity of the DB plans and describing the types of DC plans that are available.
We find that public sector DB plans generally provide high income replacement rates during retirement for employees who retire from the public sector with long tenures, but even within this set of employees, there is a large amount of heterogeneity in the replacement rate across plans. In contrast, employees who leave the public sector with shorter tenures are not covered as generously. In public DC plans, mandatory employee contributions and employer contributions that are not contingent on employee choices are much more common than in private DC plans, and these combined contributions are often a large fraction of employee salary. We conclude by summarizing previous research findings on employee savings behavior in private DC plans and discussing how this research points to areas where the design of public sector pension plans could be improved.
I. The Public Sector Pension Landscape

A. Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans in the Public Sector
In the United States, there are over 2,500 different public employee retirement systems providing benefits to the over 20 million individuals employed in the public sector.
1 For most of these employees, the primary retirement income benefit is a DB pension plan. According to Snell (2010a) , -91 percent of full-time state and local government employees are covered by a traditional, defined benefit retirement plan.‖ Although DC plans are making some inroads in the public sector, quantifying their importance is difficult because the data collected on public sector retirement plans have largely focused on DB plans.
Pensions & Investments has compiled data on the 1,000 largest retirement plan sponsors (public and private) in the U.S., as measured by assets under management (Pensions & Investments, 2010a and 2010b) . Of the 1,000 largest plans in 2009, 222 are classified as public 1 The number of retirement systems comes from the U.S. Census Bureau: http://www.census.gov/govs/retire/2008ret05a.html (accessed August 4, 2010) . The total number of retirement systems is comprised of 218 state systems, 160 county systems, 2,054 municipal/township systems, and 118 school and special district systems. The number of public sector employees comes from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat15.pdf (accessed August 5, 2010 To get a more complete picture of the role of DC plans in the public sector, we compiled information on the retirement plans offered to new hires in 2010 in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the 20 largest cities, and the 20 largest counties in the U.S. (as measured by population). 4 Some jurisdictions have a single plan for most or all public sector employees, whereas others have separate plans for different employee categories, such as teachers, public safety workers, and elected officials. 5 In Tables 1A (states Befitting his name, Joe has never married and has no dependents. The absence of spousal labor and pension income means that the automatic replacement rate we calculate for Joe approximates the ratio of his retirement consumption to his pre-retirement consumption if he does no saving outside the DB pension both before and after retirement. Of course, the beforetax generosity of Joe's state pension benefits does not depend upon his marital status or number of dependents, at least as long as he is alive.
We assume that Joe has a final pre-retirement salary of either $50,000 or $100,000, and has experienced 1% annual real wage growth up until age 60 and 0% nominal wage growth until his retirement at age 65. We consider six different work histories for Joe:
A) Joe retires having worked for 40 years, all of it in the public sector B) Joe retires having worked for 35 years, all of it in the public sector The automatic replacement rates in Table 2 Several states have decreased the generosity of their DB pension in ways that do not show up in Figure 1 . For example, an increase in the years of service at which employees vest would reduce the automatic replacement ratio of employees who leave the public sector with years of service between the old and the new vesting thresholds. Many states have adopted -antispiking provisions‖ to combat the practice of artificially inflating pay in the final year or two before retirement by taking extremely high amounts of overtime or getting short-term -promotions‖ into higher-paying positions. Since pension formulas depend on some measure of final average pay, spiking increases pension payouts in retirement. 14 We have assumed that Joe's pay is flat during his last five years before retirement, so the automatic replacement rates that we 10 calculate are not influenced by spiking. States are also reducing the generosity of their retiree health insurance, a valuable benefit that we do not incorporate into our replacement rate calculation. The current fiscal situation facing many jurisdictions will likely precipitate many more such changes. To the extent that pensions are becoming less generous in some of the less visible ways discussed above, this may increase the need for supplemental DC savings.
C. The Adequacy of State Defined Contribution Pensions
The adequacy of DC savings plans is more difficult to assess than that of DB plans because their adequacy often depends significantly on participant behavior: Are employees participating, how much are they contributing, and what type of asset allocation do they choose?
In most private sector 401(k) plans, there are many ways employees can fall short (Munnell and Sundén, 2004) : they can delay enrolling in the plan, choose a contribution rate that is too low to generate the necessary resources to maintain consumption in retirement, or choose an inappropriate asset allocation (e.g., investing heavily in employer stock, investing in high-fee funds, or investing in a manner that does not match their risk tolerance). 15 Thus, in the three states whose only primary plan is the DC plan, contributions to the DC plan are automatic and employees cannot opt out. In the states that allow employees to choose a DC plan as their primary plan, the default primary plan is the DB plan (or the hybrid DB/DC plan in the State of Washington), so mandatory DC plan contributions do not commence unless the employee actively enrolls in the DC plan.
In the private sector, most DC plans are funded by elective employee contributions and an employer contribution that depends on the employee's contribution (e.g., the employer will match 50% of employee contributions up to 3% of pay). One area where public and private sector DC plans are similar is the investment options offered. The number of investment options ranges from 10 to the low 20s with only one exception, South Carolina, which has four different investment fund managers and a total of 85 funds. All of the fund menus have investment options that span the risk-expected return spectrum, and most include target date funds. The default fund is either an age-appropriate target date fund or a balanced fund with the exception of Michigan, where the default is a fixed income fund. This is in line with the private sector, which has also moved toward target date and Participants in state DC plans are less likely than participants in private sector DC plans to end up with extremely low retirement savings, since most states impose high minimum contribution rates. Colorado and Ohio require combined employer plus employee contribution rates in excess of 18%. Four other states mandate combined contribution rates greater than or equal to 10%. But some states have rather low mandatory combined contribution rates.
Washington D.C. contributes only 5% of salary and allows no employee contributions, and North Dakota's combined mandatory contribution is 8.12% of salary, with no possibility for employees to contribute more. Michigan's minimum mandatory contribution rate is 4%, but employees can accumulate more by making additional optional employee contributions and earning the accompanying employer match.
II. Behavioral Economics and Retirement Savings
We now turn to a brief summary of the behavioral economics literature on retirement savings. In Section III, we will apply these research findings to the public sector retirement plans that we have described in Section I.
Several recent papers document a pervasive lack of financial literacy in the U.S.
population (e.g., Mitchell, 2006 and 2007; Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto, 2010; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009; Applied Research and Consulting, 2009 Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2010a) show that simplifying the savings plan enrollment process leads to sizeable increases in participation.
Second, savings and investment outcomes are heavily influenced by plan design features that matter little in standard economic models. The best evidence on this front is the sensitivity of outcomes to the plan defaults. Savings plan participation increases greatly following employer adoption of automatic enrollment, which changes the plan default from non-participation to participation, and contribution rates and asset allocations shift toward the automatic enrollment defaults (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Metrick, 2004 and Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian, 2008) . Allowing employees to choose automatic future contribution rates increases leads to sizeable future increases in savings (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004) . Portfolios are more heavily invested in employer stock when the employer match is invested by default in employer stock (Benartzi, 2001; Choi, Laibson and Madrian, 2009b) . The fraction of pension beneficiaries choosing a joint and survivor annuity increased substantially when this option became the legal default for married individuals (Holden and Nicholson, 1998; Saku, 2005) .
Defaults are not the only plan design feature that significantly influences savings and investment outcomes. In plans without an employer match, discretionary employee contribution rates are influenced by whether mandatory contributions are labeled as employee or employer contributions (Card and Ransom, forthcoming) . Several authors have found that asset allocation choices are sensitive to the structure of the investment menu (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner, 2007; Karlsson, Massa, and Simonov, 2007) and the form on which individuals must indicate their choices (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007) .
Third, individuals pay too much attention to irrelevant information and too little attention to relevant information. For example, individuals chase past returns in both their asset allocation choices (Benartzi, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick, 2004; Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini, 2009; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2010) and contribution rate choices ) while paying too little attention to mutual fund fees (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2010) .
A fourth pattern is a reliance on heuristics and rules of thumb in decision making. For example, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) document what they call -naïve diversification‖:
14 individuals diversify by investing in several different mutual funds, but they fail to account for the underlying correlations in returns across the funds when making their choices. 16 Choi,
Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2006) show that employees disproportionately choose 401(k) contribution rates that are divisible by 5.
Finally, individuals do a poor job of integrating various aspects of their financial lives; rather, they appear to engage in mental accounting, making decisions in each subset of their portfolio without considering their choices in other subsets (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2009b; Card and Ransom, forthcoming) .
This long list of biases has complex implications for the overall adequacy of retirement savings. Depending on the institutional environment, some behavioral biases will generate excessive accumulation of retirement wealth whereas other biases will generate inadequate accumulation of retirement wealth.
To illustrate the case of excess accumulation, consider an individual who has a large DB pension claim, but fails to fully account for that claim when making retirement savings decisions.
For example, the individual might mentally segregate their DB claim and follow a simple heuristic in choosing an active savings rate in his DC account, for instance, save up to the match threshold, which is 6% of income in a typical private sector DC plan. Assuming that the employee's contributions are partially matched, the total implicit saving rate could far exceed 20% once the DB accumulation and Social Security are also taken into account. In this scenario, the individual might save far too much, particularly if he has a low level of labor income and a correspondingly high Social Security replacement rate. Likewise, consider a completely passive individual who works for an employer with a DB plan and also a DC plan that has automatic enrollment, an employer match, and automatic contribution escalation. In this setting, such a household might also end up saving far too much.
On the other hand, the passive behavior noted above could lead to insufficient retirement wealth accumulation in other contexts. For example, a largely passive individual who works for an employer with neither a DB nor a DC savings plan could save far too little.
Behavioral biases therefore predict a mixed picture of heterogeneous savings outcomes, Sholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun, 2006; Engen, Gale and Uccello, 1999) , while others conclude that most individuals are falling short of where they need to be (Munnell, Webb and Golub-Sass, 2007) .
III. Implications for Public Sector Retirement Plans
What are the implications of these behavioral patterns for thinking about how well public sector retirement plans meet the retirement income needs of public sector employees?
We start by considering the situation of employees who have a primary DB plan. DB plans have been characterized as being less complicated than DC plans for their participants.
Indeed, DC plans demand-or at least allow-a substantial amount of individual autonomy, whereas DB plans require almost no choices by participants before retirement. But there are many complicated features of DB plans that have implications for how employees use the supplemental DC savings plans they are offered.
The formulas determining DB pension payouts seem relatively straightforward on the surface: final average salary multiplied by years of service multiplied by a retirement factor. But these formulas often have complicated wrinkles, such as limits on the growth in final wages that will count in the formula, future cost-of-living adjustments that are hard to value, and rules about the combination of age and years of service that must be attained to receive a full benefit. Many individuals have misconceptions about their retirement benefits, which may affect their choices about how much to save in their supplemental DC plans.
DB plans reward tenure, since most payout formulas depend directly on years of service and some measure of final average pay, which is itself often related to tenure. Individuals who leave the public sector with relatively low levels of tenure will be entitled to very little or nothing at all. Although the common perception is that public sector workers are generally long-term employees, a recent Maine task force report claims that over half of public sector workers in The annual statements that Social Security sends to participants projecting their future benefits do not account for the effects of the WEP, so affected state employees may mistakenly believe that they are entitled to higher Social Security benefits than they will in fact receive, altering their savings and retirement decisions.
In some states, employees have a choice of plans in which to participate, which adds yet another layer of complexity. Employees do not typically have the option of procrastinating indefinitely, because there is a deadline by which a decision must be made. 17 But in fact, the decision does not need to be explicitly made, since the employer specifies a default plan for individuals who do not state a preference. Table 4 lists the states that offer a choice of primary plan, which plan is their default option, and the fraction of new employees who end up in each option in the states from which were able to get that information. The default is the DB plan in all of the choice states except Washington, where the default is a hybrid DB/DC plan. Consistent with previous research, the large majority of employees-79% to 87%-end up in whichever plan is the default. especially for employees younger than 30, whom she calculates are least likely to benefit from being in the DB plan. 18 Brown and Weisbenner also find that the default is powerful, and employees who opt out of the default tend to choose a dominated non-default plan.
Instead of having a default, employees could be required to actively choose their primary plan before a deadline. Carroll et al. (2009) study such a regime in a private 401(k) plan that required employees to actively choose a (possibly zero) contribution rate within 30 days of hire.
This approach prevents employees from finding themselves in an inappropriate plan through passivity, but also places a heavy burden on employees to gather enough information to make a wise decision. Thus, active decision regimes are best accompanied by mechanisms that help employees quickly and easily understand their options.
An interesting design choice is whether to make the plan choice reversible. In some states, the plan choice is irreversible, whereas in other states, employees have one or more opportunities to switch between plans. Reversibility may complicate the decision-making task even further, and could cause employees to make their initial choice less thoughtfully. On the other hand, flexibility is valuable if employees make a mistake in their initial choice, or if their circumstances change.
All states with a DC-only plan remove at least one layer of complexity by automatically enrolling employees in the DC plan with an employer contribution that is not contingent on employee choices. Most go a step further by also requiring a fixed contribution on the part of employees, some at relatively high rates. The default investment fund in these plans is typically a target date fund. Although target date funds are not perfect, they are diversified across multiple asset classes and automatically become less risky as the participant ages.
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The complexity in public DC plans comes from the optional supplemental savings plans, in which employees must determine their appropriate contribution rates and asset allocations. As noted in Section I, not all DB and primary DC plans generate high retirement income replacement rates for all public sector workers, resulting in the need to utilize these supplemental plans. Some aspects of the supplemental plans' complexity seem unnecessary. For example, a state may have one provider administering its primary DC plan with one set of investment options, another provider with a completely different set of investment options managing its first supplemental plan, and yet another provider with a third set of investment options for its second supplemental plan. If there are multiple supplemental plans, employees who want to augment their primary benefits would have to choose which supplemental plan to use first. Like the choice between a DB and a DC plan discussed above, this is not necessarily a straightforward decision.
Another source of complexity in both DB and DC plans is the process of transforming accumulated benefits into retirement income. Most private sector DC plans do not have an annuitization option within the plan, so accumulated balances are not automatically converted into a payment stream upon retirement. Rather, retirees must take some action to convert their plan balances into an annuity, or they must self-manage spending down their wealth in retirement. In the private sector DC plans that do offer an annuity option, the take-up rate of this option is quite low. The low rate of annuitization both within and outside of DC plans is often referred to as the -annuity puzzle‖ because it goes against theoretical predictions that individuals should have a strong demand for annuities to insure against longevity risk (Yaari, 1965; Brown, 2007 Statistics, 2007) . Anecdotal discussions with those in the pension and retirement savings industry suggest that when a lump sum option is available, the majority of participants elect the lump sum. So the trend in private sector DB plans is towards decreased levels of annuitization. Public sector DB plans are still more aggressive in promoting annuitization. Only a third of states allow employees the option of taking a lump sum withdrawal, and in most of these, the lump-sum payout is limited to the equivalent of a few years of annuitized benefits.
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IV. Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided an overview of the public sector pension landscape in the U.S. Although DB plans remain the predominant primary plan, some jurisdictions-particularly at the state level-have opted to offer only a DC plan or have given employees a choice among a DB, DC, and hybrid DB/DC plans. All jurisdictions have one or more supplemental DC plans available to employees.
20 Chalmers and Reuter (2009) and Previtero (2010) show that annuitization rates vary negatively with recent equity market returns, perhaps reflecting shifts in workers' confidence in their ability to generate high returns by investing their savings on their own. Hu and Scott (2007) , Brown, Kling, Mullainathan and Wrobel (2008) , and Agnew, Anderson, Gerlach and Szykman (2008) argue that annuity demand is affected by framing, i.e., the arbitrary mental filter through which individuals interpret the annuity choice. 21 Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and Washington have a mechanism for converting DC balances into an annuity. Michigan facilitates annuitization of DC balances through a platform that gives participants competing quotes from several different annuity providers. 22 Retirees may take their entire benefit as a lump sum in Delaware, Kentucky, Pennsylvania and South Dakota. In Oregon and Wisconsin, retirees may only take their entire benefit as a lump sum if the monthly annuity benefit to which they are entitled is below a low threshold. The following states allow a partial lump sum payout: Arizona, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Utah and Virginia.
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We document substantial heterogeneity across jurisdictions in the extent to which their DB, DC, or hybrid DB/DC plans automatically set employees up for high retirement income replacement rates. Employees in plans that will provide them with less automatic savings probably need to engage in some supplemental savings in order to maintain their standard of living in retirement. The need for supplemental savings is particularly high for low-tenured workers who may not vest in a DB plan or who may only partially vest in a DC plan.
We conclude by discussing how recent behavioral economics research on savings and investing behavior applies to the institutions and choices that employees face in public sector retirement plans. Most public sector DC plans do not allow employees any choice in how much gets contributed to the plan, and employees' assets are directed by default into target date retirement funds. By limiting the amount of choice employees have in the primary DC plan, public sector retirement plan designers are likely to have eliminated most of the left tail of savings outcomes that arise in private sector DC plans due to financial illiteracy, procrastination, and time-inconsistent tastes for immediate consumption gratification, although it is unknown how large of a welfare cost reducing choice exacts due to rational employees' reduced ability to smooth marginal utility intertemporally. Public sector supplemental DC plans are typically more complicated and confusing than those found in the private sector, since there are often multiple supplemental plans offered, and since each supplemental plan may be operated by a different financial services company. More research is needed to determine why the supplemental plans are structured as they are and how variation in their structure affects how well public sector employees do when faced with these types of choices. For every scenario, we calculate Joe's pension income assuming a pre-retirement final salary of $50,000 or $100,000. We calculate Joe's final average salary, which is used in each state's defined benefit pension benefit formula, from Joe's nominal earnings profile. His years of credited service consist solely of his public sector tenure, which varies by scenario. Once we have calculated the yearly pension benefit provided by each plan, we compare these amounts with the plan's minimum and maximum allowances, if they exist, and modify his pension benefits if necessary to satisfy these constraints.
Calculating Social Security Benefits for State Employees
We assume that Joe claims his Social Security benefit when he retires in 2010 at age 65.
In order to calculate the benefit amount, we take the lower of Joe's nominal earnings and the maximum Social Security taxable earnings for each year of his career. We index the resulting values by multiplying them by the Social Security Administration wage index factors. To obtain Joe's average indexed monthly earnings (AIME), we sum the 35 years of highest indexed earnings, divide by 420 (= 35 years × 12 months), and round to the nearest lower dollar. Using the 2007 bend points of $680 and $4,100, we multiply the first $680 of the AIME by 0.9, the amount over $680 and less than or equal to $4,100 by 0.32, and the amount over $4,100 by 0.15.
We add the three values generated from the previous step and round to the nearest lower 10 cents to get the primary insurance amount (PIA). To account for cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), the PIA is increased beginning in 2007, the year that Joe reaches age 62. We multiply his PIA by the 2007 COLA factor and round the resulting amount to the nearest lower 10 cents. We repeat this process using the 2008 COLA factor. In effect, we obtain the full monthly Social Security benefit. However, since Joe chooses to receive his benefit prior to reaching the normal Social Security retirement age of 66 for individuals in his birth cohort, his benefit is reduced. In Joe's case, his benefit is reduced by 5/9 of 1 percent for each of the 12 months that he receives a benefit before age 66. After making this reduction, we multiply the revised monthly benefit by 12 to obtain his annual Social Security benefit.
In states whose general employees are covered by Social Security, Joe is entitled to the above benefit. In states whose employees do not participate in Social Security, Joe only receives a Social Security benefit if he has at least 10 years of substantial earnings through private sector employment. If Joe has fewer than 30 years of creditable earnings, Joe's benefit is reduced in accordance with the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP). In states without Social Security participation, the WEP is relevant in scenarios E and F (in which Joe has 15 years of private sector employment and 20 years of public sector employment). Under these scenarios in states without Social Security participation, we change the 0.9 multiplicative factor for the first 2007 bend point to 0.4 and compute the resulting Social Security benefit.
Calculating State and Federal Income Taxes
Before retirement, we assume that Joe's only source of income is his salary. 
